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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
two independent wrongs in such a case, and indemnification has
been allowed against the negligent physician.'0
The allowance of impleader in the instant case was proper
because it was certainly possible (in fact, quite probable) that
the defendant would be found only "passively" negligent as to the
wrongful death action. Even though the complaint did charge
the defendant with actively injuring plaintiff's intestate's hand, it
was reasonable to infer an allegation of "passive" negligence on
the part of the defendant as to the fatal injury. It has been held
that where a defendant "is alleged to be guilty of both active
and passive negligence, impleader of the person claimed to be guilty
of active negligence is proper .... ,0o
The decision in Musco is also in accord with the purpose of
third-party practice in that it avoids circuity and multiplicity of
actions by furnishing a method of trial of all issues between the
parties without seriously prejudicing the rights of any party.
Intervention allowed to defend constitutionality of statute granting
partial tax exemption.
Representatives of thirteen railroads sought to intervene 107
as defendants in an action 108 brought to contest the constitutionality
of a statute granting partial real property tax exemptions to
railroads.109 Movant-intervenors urged that they had a substantial
economic interest in the outcome of the action since they had
already realized a substantial tax reduction under the statute.
Plaintiff contested the motion, claiming that the intervenors' interest
was not such a "real interest" as would justify the granting of the
motion. The court, exercising the discretionary power given it by
CPLR 1013, granted the motion to intervene. Stressing the
disastrous economic effect on all the railroads in the state if
plaintiff were successful in invalidating the statute, the court con-
cluded that the railroads had a "real and substantial interest in
the outcome of this proceeding." It was further indicated that
plaintiff would nowise be prejudiced by the granting of the motion;
nor would there be any unusual delay occasioned by the intervention.
To ensure that there would be no delay, the court conditioned
its order by stating that the intervenor could not reopen any
1D See Rizzo v. Steiner, 36 Misc. 2d 701, 233 N.Y.S.2d 647 (Sup. Ct
1962); Rezza v. Isaacson, 13 Misc. 2d 794, 178 N.Y.S.2d 481 (Sup. Ct.
1958).
106 Putvin v. Buffalo Elec. Co., supra note 97, at 455, 158 N.E.2d at 695,
186 N.Y.S.2d at 21.
107 CPLR 1012 (intervention as of right); CPLR 1013 (intervention by
permission).
108City of Buffalo v. State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 44
Misc. 2d 716, 254 N.Y.S.2d 699 (Sup. Ct 1964).
109N.Y. REAL PROP. TAx LAW §489 a-v; N.Y. STAE FiN. LAW § 54(b).
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phase of the case nor duplicate any of the proceedings already
undertaken. However, the intervenors were given the opportunity
to move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(3)
and (7).
The court's holding seems consonant with the liberal attitude
toward intervention which has been adopted by most of the courts
which have considered the question. 1 0 When the intervenor has a
definite interest in the litigation and can shed valuable light on the
issues before the court, without causing undue delay, intervention
is usually permitted. The practitioner would do well to keep the
instant case in mind whenever intervention is sought either to
sustain or contest a statute in which his client has a substantial
interest-be it pecuniary or otherwise.
Nominal corporate defendant allowed substitution as plaintiff
despite lack of express sanction in Article 10.
Lazar v. Merchants' Natl Properties, Inc.,1  was a stock-
holders' derivative suit wherein the corporation was named as a
nominal defendant 1 12 after refusing to bring suit in its own
name. During the trial, however, the board of directors resolved
that the prosecution of the action would be in the best interests
of the corporation. It therefore moved to substitute the corporation
as plaintiff in place of the plaintiff-shareholder, who did not
object.1 13 The appellate division, first department, granted the
motion for substitution over the objection of the real-party
defendants. 1 4
The significance of this decision is that the court granted
substitution in the absence of any express statutory provision 115
or judicial precedent authorizing such procedure. Impliedly,
110 See 2 WEmsmN, Koaw & MILLER, Naw YoiK CIVIL PRAcTicE
f11012.04 (1964) and cases cited therein.
11122 App. Div. 2d 253, 254 N.Y.S2d 712 (1st Dep't 1964).
112A corporation, in whose name a derivative suit is brought, is held
to be an indispensable party to the action for two reasons: (1) recovery
must run in its favor, and, (2) it must be prevented from itself suing the
defendants at a later date on the same cause of action. BAKER & CARY,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORoRA-roms 650 (3d ed. abr. 1959). Therefore,
it must be named as a defendant when it refuses to be joined as a plain-
tiff. CPLR 1001(a).
113An interesting and as yet unanswered problem would have arisen
had the plaintiff-shareholder refused to acquiesce when the corporation
requested substitution. There appears to be no case in which such a problem
has been presented.
114The defendants had already made a motion to dismiss, and since
CPLR 3211 allows only one such motion, the court conditioned the granting
of substitution upon the corporation's consenting to allow defendant to make
a new motion under that rule.
115 Neither the CPLR nor the Business Corporation Law contains any
provision which would expressly sanction such a procedure.
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